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Abstract 
This paper compares impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in the euro area 
countries before the EMU and in the New Member States (NMS) from central-eastern 
Europe. We mitigate the small sample problem, which is especially acute for the NMS, 
by using a Bayesian estimation that combines information across countries. The impulse 
responses in the NMS are broadly similar to those in the euro area countries. There is 
some evidence that in the NMS, which have had higher and more volatile inflation, the 
Phillips curve is steeper than in the euro area countries. This finding is consistent with 
economic theory. 
Keywords: monetary policy transmission, Structural VAR, Bayesian estimation, 
exchangeable prior 
JEL Classification: C11, C32, C33, E40, E52 5
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Non-technical summary 
This paper compares impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in the euro area 
countries before the EMU and in the New Member States (NMS) from central-eastern 
Europe. The goal of this exercise is to understand how different characteristics of 
these groups of countries affect their monetary transmission. 
The EU New Member States (NMS) from the central-eastern Europe are, in many 
important respects, quite different from the old EU members. It is well known that 
their financial systems, measured by total financial assets or stock market 
capitalization, are much smaller relative to GDP than those of the old EU member 
states (see e.g. Angeloni et al., 2005). It is reasonable to expect that in such conditions 
monetary policy may have a weaker impact on the economy. Central banks in the 
NMS also have shorter track records, which may make it more difficult to affect 
agents' expectations, potentially resulting in longer price response lags. 
On the other hand, even with small institutional financial markets, prevailing interest 
rates still matter for many economic decisions and transactions, such as trade credits 
or the reinvestment of profits. In the context of other countries, there is also research 
suggesting that some financial system imperfections may actually strengthen 
monetary transmission (see e.g. Kashyap and Stein, 2000). 
Another potentially important feature of the NMS is that they have had higher average 
inflation rates. Economic theories predict that this should have implications for 
monetary transmission. New-Keynesian models which allow price stickiness to be 
determined endogenously predict that in a higher inflation environment agents adjust 
their prices more often, so there is less price stickiness (see Ball et al., 1988; Dotsey et 
al., 1999). With less price stickiness, the Phillips curve is steeper, and, consequently, 
the output cost of disinflation (the 'sacrice ratio') is lower. This is confirmed 
empirically in Ball et al. (1988) cross-country study. In practice, the level and the 
standard deviation of inflation are positively correlated (which is confirmed also for 
the studied countries). In the Lucas (1973) imperfect information model, more volatile 
inflation makes agents, ceteris paribus, adjust prices more than their output. 
Therefore, the Lucas model also predicts that the NMS should have a steeper Phillips 
curve. 
Numerous VAR studies of monetary transmission have been performed for the euro 
area economies, among others in the context of the Monetary Transmission Network 
(see e.g. Mojon and Peersman 2001). Such studies have also been extended to the 
NMS (e.g. Elbourne and de Haan (2006); Gavin and Kemme (2004) and Anzuini and 
Levy (2007), see also surveys in Ganev et al. (2002) and Coricelli et al. (2006)). Most 
of these works concentrated on comparisons between individual NMS, and it seems 
that few robust lessons emerge regarding qualitative differences across regions. 
What has been largely missing so far is an explicit comparison of impulse responses 
to monetary policy shocks across the two regions - central-eastern and western Europe 
- estimated with a consistent methodology. Such a comparison can be expected to be 
more meaningful and interesting than the many intra-regional comparisons performed 
so far, as the structural differences between these regions dwarf those within them. 
This paper fills this gap by using an econometric technique which makes it possible to 
robustly estimate responses for both regions despite short data series. 6
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The empirical analysis focuses on EA5 countries (Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) and NMS4 countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). 
The specification and identification used are justified by standard economic theory, 
and identical for both regions. Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks have 
similar signs and qualitative characteristics in both regions, and are reasonable from 
the point of view of economic theory. No ‘price puzzle’ (i.e. a increase of prices in 
response to monetary tightening) emerges in any of the countries. In spite of the 
structural differences between the regions, the impulse responses of output and prices 
to monetary policy shocks are not statistically significantly different. 
We do not find support for the relative ineffectiveness of monetary policy in the 
NMS4. Uncertainty bands for NMS4 price responses are much wider and they include 
the possibility of even stronger effects of monetary policy on prices than in the euro 
area countries, especially for lags longer than one year. Second, we find that, 
consistently with the predictions of economic theories, the NMS4 may have steeper 
Phillips curves, so that they face a lower output cost of disinflation (sacrifice ratio). 
Furthermore, we find that in later sub-samples, when inflation in the NMS4 has 
abated, price responses become weaker and monetary transmission even more similar 
to that in the euro area. We conclude that the structural weakness of monetary 
transmission in the NMS is quantitatively less important than often believed, and that 
the effect of higher and more volatile inflation rates in the sample may be important. 7
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1 Introduction
Ever since the seminal paper by Sims (1980), which introduced Vector Au-
toregressions (VARs), there has been interest in comparing impulse responses
to monetary policy shocks estimated for diﬀerent countries.1 These compar-
isons were motivated by the study of robustness, and tended to stress sim-
ilarities across countries. The interest in potential cross-country diﬀerences
in monetary transmission was boosted prior to the creation of the economic
and monetary union (EMU) in Europe, because such diﬀerences are highly
undesirable within currency unions.2 It was pointed out that signiﬁcant dif-
ferences exist in some countries’ structural characteristics, including among
potential EMU members. Understanding how structural diﬀerences aﬀect
economies’ responses to monetary policy is especially relevant in the context
of prospective currency unions, but is also of great importance for monetary
economics and policy in general.
Examples of papers discussing the impact of European economies’ struc-
tural characteristics on the monetary transmission are Dornbusch et al. (1998);
Cecchetti (1999); Guiso et al. (1999); Mihov (2001) and Ehrmann et al.
(2003). These papers ﬁrst look at indicators of interest sensitivity of output,
size, health and structure of the banking sector, stock market capitalization
and other. They then relate them, by theoretical reasoning, to the strength
of monetary transmission. Results of this type of analysis are often ambigu-
ous, as diﬀerent characteristics sometimes have conﬂicting implications, and
their relative quantitative importance is uncertain. The ultimate judgment
has to come from macroeconomic data, usually analyzed with a Structural
VAR technique. Papers in this line of research naturally fall into two cat-
egories: those that ﬁnd signiﬁcant and interpretable diﬀerences among the
examined countries, and those that do not. Examples of the ﬁrst group are
Ramaswamy and Sløk (1998); Cecchetti (1999) and Mihov (2001). Papers in
the second category, such as Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998) and Mojon and
Peersman (2001), ﬁnd that whatever asymmetries in monetary transmission
may exist among EU countries, they are not strong enough to be robustly
1Sims (1980) compared impulse responses to monetary and other innovations in the
US and Germany. Other examples of studies applying common identifying assumptions
to several countries are Sims (1992); Kim (1999); and Kim and Roubini (2000); as well as
papers quoted below.
2As discussed e.g. in Dornbusch et al. (1998), the concern is that the burden of disin-
ﬂation would fall disproportionately on some countries, while others would have to accept
higher than average inﬂation. This would make conducting common monetary policy po-
litically diﬃcult. This problem is independent from the long-debated question of whether
current and potential future EMU member countries constitute an optimal currency area.8
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detected in the available data.3
The EU New Member States (NMS) from the central-eastern Europe are,
in many important respects, quite diﬀerent from the old EU members. It is
well known that their ﬁnancial systems, measured by total ﬁnancial assets or
stock market capitalization, are much smaller relative to GDP than those of
the old EU member states (see e.g. Angeloni et al., 2005). It is reasonable to
expect that in such conditions monetary policy may have a weaker impact
on the economy. Central banks in the NMS also have shorter track records,
which may make it more diﬃcult to aﬀect agents’ expectations, potentially
resulting in longer price response lags.
On the other hand, even with small institutional ﬁnancial markets, pre-
vailing interest rates still matter for many economic decisions and transac-
tions, such as trade credits or the reinvestment of proﬁts. In the context of
other countries, there is also research suggesting that ﬁnancial system im-
perfections may actually strengthen monetary transmission (see e.g. Kashyap
and Stein, 2000).
Another potentially important feature of the NMS is that they have
had higher average inﬂation rates. This is shown in Table 1 (the choice
of countries and sample periods is justiﬁed in section 3). Economic theories
predict that this should have implications for monetary transmission. New-
Keynesian models which allow price stickiness to be determined endogenously
predict that in a higher inﬂation environment agents adjust their prices more
often, so there is less price stickiness (see Ball et al., 1988; Dotsey et al., 1999).
With less price stickiness, the Phillips curve is steeper, and, consequently, the
output cost of disinﬂation (the ’sacriﬁce ratio’) is lower. This is conﬁrmed
empirically in Ball et al. (1988) cross-country study. In practice, the level
and the standard deviation of inﬂation are positively correlated (which is
conﬁrmed in Table 1). In the Lucas (1973) imperfect information model,
more volatile inﬂation makes agents, ceteris paribus, adjust prices more than
their output. Therefore, the Lucas model also predicts that the NMS should
have a steeper Phillips curve.
VAR studies of monetary transmission have also been extended to the
NMS. Examples are Elbourne and de Haan (2006); Gavin and Kemme (2004)
and Anzuini and Levy (2007). Ganev et al. (2002) and Coricelli et al. (2006)
contain surveys of this literature. Most of these works concentrated on
comparisons between individual NMS, and it seems that few robust lessons
3These papers study VAR impulse responses to national monetary policy shocks. In an
alternative approach, Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2006) estimate responses to common mone-
tary policy shocks under ﬁxed exchange rates, thus mimicking the hypothetical situation
inside a monetary union. This approach does not use VARs, as in VARs exchange rates
are determined endogenously, and shocks that leave them ﬁxed are diﬃcult to construct.9
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Table 1: Annual CPI inﬂation in the East and the West.
Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovenia
1995 9.2 28.3 28.1 13.5
1996 8.8 23.6 19.8 9.8
1997 8.5 18.3 15.1 8.4
1998 10.6 14.2 11.7 7.9
1999 2.1 10.0 7.3 6.1
2000 3.9 9.8 10.1 8.9
2001 4.7 9.2 5.5 8.4
2002 1.8 5.3 1.9 7.5
2003 0.1 4.6 0.8 5.6
2004 2.8 6.8 3.6 3.6
2005 1.8 3.6 2.1 2.5
2006 2.5 3.9 1.1 2.5
2007 2.9 7.9 2.4 3.6
median 2.7 9.2 5.5 6.8
std.dev. 2.8 7.8 8.4 2.5
Finland France Italy Portugal Spain
1987 4.1 3.3 4.7 9.3 5.2
1988 5.1 2.7 5.1 9.7 4.8
1989 6.6 3.5 6.2 12.6 6.8
1990 6.1 3.4 6.5 13.4 6.7
1991 4.1 3.2 6.3 10.9 5.9
1992 2.6 2.4 5.1 8.9 5.9
1993 2.1 2.1 4.5 6.5 4.6
1994 1.1 1.7 4.0 5.2 4.7
1995 1.0 1.8 5.2 4.1 4.7
1996 0.6 2.0 4.0 3.1 3.6
1997 1.2 1.2 2.0 2.2 2.0
1998 1.4 0.6 2.0 2.7 1.8
median 2.4 2.2 4.9 7.7 4.8
std.dev. 2.1 0.9 1.5 3.9 1.6
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. Medians and standard deviations are
calculated for all periods presented except for the Czech Republic (years 1998-2007) and
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emerge regarding qualitative diﬀerences across regions.
What has been largely missing so far is an explicit comparison of impulse
responses to monetary policy shocks across the two regions - central-eastern
and western Europe - estimated with a consistent methodology. Such a com-
parison can be expected to be more meaningful and interesting than the
many intra-regional comparisons performed so far, as the structural diﬀer-
ences between these regions dwarf those within them. This paper ﬁlls this
gap by using an econometric technique which makes it possible to robustly
estimate responses for both regions despite short data series.
The comparison yields interesting results: First, in spite of the structural
diﬀerences between the regions, the impulse responses of output and prices to
monetary policy shocks are similar in the NMS and in the euro area countries.
We do not ﬁnd support for the relative ineﬀectiveness of monetary policy
in the NMS. Uncertainty bands for NMS price responses are much wider
and they include the possibility of even stronger eﬀects of monetary policy
than in the euro area countries. Second, we ﬁnd that, consistently with
the predictions of economic theories, the NMS may have steeper Phillips
curves, so that they face a lower output cost of disinﬂation (sacriﬁce ratio).
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that in later subsamples, when inﬂation in the NMS
has abated, price responses become weaker and monetary transmission more
similar to that in the euro area. We conclude that the structural weakness
of monetary transmission in the NMS is quantitatively less important than
often believed, and that the eﬀect of higher and more volatile inﬂation rates
in the sample may be important.
The principal obstacle in the study of the former centrally planned
economies are the short available data series. To mitigate this problem,
we perform a Bayesian estimation with the prior (called the exchangeable
prior), which conveys the intuition that parameters of the VAR models for
individual countries are similar across the region, since all economies in the
region are special cases of the same underlying economic model. This prior
results in the posterior which pools information across countries, ensuring
eﬃcient use of the scarce data. The classical discussion of exchangeable pri-
ors for linear regression models can be found in Lindley and Smith (1972).
The present paper adapts to VARs the formulation of Gelman et al. (2003),
called the Hierarchical Linear Model.
Exchangeable priors have had a number of applications in econometric
studies. The closest paper is Canova (2005), who uses the exchangeable prior
in the estimation of VARs for Latin American countries to study the trans-
mission of US shocks. Another related work is Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2006),
who use the exchangeable prior in the estimation of a small multi-country
time-varying model to study heterogeneity and time-variation of responses11
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to monetary policy in the run-up to the EMU (see footnote 3). Other appli-
cations of the exchangeable prior are Canova and Marcet (1995), who study
income convergence in panels of countries and regions; Zellner and Hong
(1989), who ﬁnd that the exchangeable prior improves the out-of-sample
forecasting ability in time series models; and Canova and Ciccarelli (2004),
who use it in their forecasting time-varying VARs.
In a related line of research, Gavin and Kemme (2004) use the posteriors
from the OECD economies as priors for monetary VARs for the NMS and
ﬁnd that this prior improves their forecasting performance. The use of de-
veloped country data as a source of prior for the former centrally planned
economies had been pioneered by Leamer and Taylor (1999). In contrast to
these studies, in the present paper, priors for the central-eastern European
countries are exchangeable only within the region, and are unaﬀected by the
information from western Europe.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the estimation
of reduced form VARs for a panel of countries as a Hierarchical Linear Model
and the identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks. Section 3 presents the
empirical results, and Section 4 contains conclusions. Details about data
sources are in the appendix.
2 Econometric model
VAR models contain many parameters and with short samples, such as those
available for the former centrally planned economies, they produce wide er-
ror bands and point estimates which are very sensitive to small changes in
sample or speciﬁcation. The strategy employed here to obtain more robust
results is to analyze jointly whole regions (ﬁrst euro area, then NMS) and
exploit the intuition that parameters of VAR models for individual countries
are similar across the region, since all economies in the region are special
cases of the same underlying economic model. However, we need to stop
short of assuming that all slope coeﬃcients are the same across countries
and performing a standard panel estimation. This assumption would only
be an approximation, and in a dynamic model such as a VAR, it could se-
riously distort the results (Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that it results in
an inconsistent estimator).
The estimation procedure is Bayesian and uses the Hierarchical Linear
Model of Gelman et al. (2003).4 The idea of similarity is formalized as a
4Classical estimators for heterogeneous panels exist, but are much less eﬃcient: the
Monte Carlo study in Hsiao et al. (1999) shows that in small samples they perform worse
than a variant of the Bayesian estimator with the exchangeable prior.12
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Gaussian prior for each country’s coeﬃcients, which is centered at a common
mean for the region (an exchangeable prior). This prior causes the coeﬃ-
cients to be shrunk towards the common mean. The second stage of the
hierarchy consists of the hyperprior about the prior parameters: the com-
mon mean and the variance of country coeﬃcients around the common mean
(hypervariance). The Hierarchical Linear Model allows to specify the pri-
ors in the second stage of the hierarchy as noninformative, and let the data
speak about the posterior common mean and hypervariance, given the as-
sumed likelihood and prior structure. Intuitively, more diﬀerent and more
tightly estimated country coeﬃcients increase the posterior probability of
large hypervariance values. When country coeﬃcients are more similar, or
if they diﬀer but have larger error bounds, hypervariance is more likely to
be smaller. Country models which are more tightly estimated receive more
weight in the posterior common mean, relative to countries whose estimates
are imprecise.
Below, we ﬁrst distinguish between parameters likely to be similar across
countries and those that need not be similar. We apply the exchangeable
prior to parameters that determine dynamic interrelationships between en-
dogenous variables, and reactions to some of exogenous variables. We specify
a noninformative prior for the coeﬃcients of other exogenous variables (those
which seem to have most heterogeneous eﬀects on countries) and for constant
terms, which implies that we have country ﬁxed eﬀects.
The following two subsections specify the prior in the panel VAR setup:
ﬁrst the overall framework, and then the parameterization of the hypervari-
ance. The third subsection explains the identiﬁcation of monetary policy
shocks.
2.1 Panel of VARs as a Hierarchical Linear Model
In what follows, vectors are denoted by lowercase bold symbols, matrices by
uppercase bold symbols, c =1 ...C denotes countries, l =1 ...L denotes
lags, t =1...T c denotes time periods.
For each country c in the panel we consider a reduced form N-dimensional










czct + uct (1)
yct is a vector of N endogenous variables and wt is a vector of W exogenous
variables which are common across countries. We specify an exchangeable
prior about the coeﬃcients of yc(t−l) and wt. The prior for the coeﬃcients of13
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zct, which include, for example, country-speciﬁc constant terms, is noninfor-
mative. The vector uct contains VAR innovations which are i.i.d. N(0,Σc).












t for all t we obtain the model for country c in terms of
data matrices:
Yc = XcBc + ZcΓc + Uc (2)
where Yc and Uc are Tc ×N, Xc are Tc ×K, Bc are K ×N, Zc are Tc ×Mc
and Γc are Mc×N. The coeﬃcient matrix Bc is related to coeﬃcients of (1)




Let yc =v e cYc,βc =v e cBc,γc =v e cΓc.
The statistical model generating the data is assumed to be as follows.
The likelihood for country c has the form:
p(yc|βc,γc,Σc) = N((IN ⊗ Xc)βc +( IN ⊗ Zc)γc,Σc ⊗ ITc)( 3 )
Country coeﬃcients on the variables in Xc a r ea s s u m e dt ob ed r a w nf r o m
a normal distribution with a common mean ¯ β and a variance Λc (which may
be country speciﬁc):
p(βc|¯ β,Λc)=N (¯ β,Λc)( 4 )
Λc is discussed in detail in the next subsection.
The prior for ¯ β and γc is noninformative, uniform on the real line:
p(¯ β) ∝ p(γc) ∝ 1( 5 )
Alternatively, one could use some informative prior for ¯ β, e.g. the Minnesota
prior, but this is not necessary for the estimation problem to be well posed,
and we do not pursue this possibility here. In fact, it is interesting if the
exchangeable prior can substitute the atheoretical Minnesota prior in ensur-
ing that VAR’s impulse responses are reasonable in spite of the large number
of parameters estimated with few observations. We also use the standard




The model (3)-(6) deﬁnes the structure advocated in the introduction:
the countries’ dynamic models of variables in Yc and exogenous controls in
W are special cases of the unknown underlying model deﬁned by ¯ β.
The functional form of the prior, the combination of normal, uniform,
inverted gamma and a degenerate inverted Wishart (for Σc) densities, is14
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standard, motivated by computational convenience, so that the prior is con-
ditionally conjugate. The posterior density of the model’s parameters is
computed from the Bayes theorem, as a normalized product of the likeli-
hood and the prior. The conditional conjugacy of the prior means that all
conditional posterior densities are also normal, inverted gamma or inverted
Wishart, which enables convenient numerical analysis of the posterior with
the Gibbs sampler.5
2.2 Speciﬁcation of the prior variance
What remains to be speciﬁed are Λc -t h ev a r i a n c e so fβc around the common
mean ¯ β. We would like to incorporate the prior uncertainty with respect to
these variances and learn from the data how heterogeneous the countries are.
However, we need some constraints on these NK × NK variances to make
the estimation meaningful. In this paper, they are tightly parameterized in
a way inspired by the speciﬁcation of the variance of the Minnesota prior,
as discussed in Litterman (1986) or Doan (2000). The oﬀ-diagonal terms are
set to zero. In the VAR for country c, the coeﬃcient of variable k (where
k =1 ...K runs over lags of endogenous variables and common exogenous







As implied by this formula, all variances are scaled by the common pa-
rameter λ. However, some coeﬃcients in βc’s are large, and some small.
Specifying simply a single variance of λ may imply that some coeﬃcients
are allowed to diﬀer from the common mean by a fraction of their own size,
and other by orders of magnitude. To adjust for this, as in the Minnesota
prior, we scale each coeﬃcient’s variance by a factor which adjusts for the
size of the coeﬃcient. For a variable denoted by i,ˆ σi is computed as the
estimated standard error in the univariate Lth-order autoregression for this
variable. This standard error captures the scale of unexpected movements of
the variable. The same ratio of ˆ σ2
i’s is used in the Minnesota prior, since, as
Litterman (1986) argues, what is relevant for the size of a coeﬃcient is the
relative size of unexpected movements of the involved variables.
The parameter λ determines the overall tightness of the exchangeable
prior. λ = 0 results in full pooling of information across countries and
implies a panel VAR estimation, where all βc are assumed to be identical.
5The Gibbs sampler for a similar univariate problem is discussed in detail in Gelman
et al. (2003).15
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On the other hand, as λ grows, country models are allowed to diﬀer more
and become similar to the respective single country estimates. In the ﬁrst
case the eﬀective number of coeﬃcients we estimate is NK (plus coeﬃcients
in γc’s), and in the second case it goes to CNK (plus coeﬃcients in γc’s).
We suppose that there is some intermediate range for λ which delivers a
reasonable balance between ﬁtting individual countries data on the one hand,
and constraining the speciﬁcation to make the estimates tighter on the other.
However, magnitudes of VAR coeﬃcients are hard to interpret: we just do
not know what it means in economic terms that two VAR coeﬃcients diﬀer
by, say, 1%. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to elicit a meaningful subjective prior
for λ.
Fortunately, the problem of specifying noninformative priors for such hy-
pervariances has been studied extensively in the statistical literature. Al-
ternative speciﬁcations are discussed e.g. in Gelman et al. (2003) and more
recently in Gelman (2006). One convenient form of the prior, which delivers












The standard noninformative prior for variances, p(λ) ∝ 1/λ, which ob-
tains when v =0a n ds = 0, results in an improper posterior in this setup.
The frequently used ’weakly informative’ prior with very small but strictly
positive values of s and v is shown to be sometimes quite informative in un-
intended ways, and the results may strongly depend on the chosen values. In
the case when there are more than 5 units from which the variance around
the common mean is inferred, Gelman (2006) recommends simply using the
uniform prior for the standard deviation (which translates into the prior for
variance p(λ) ∝ λ− 1
2), and this recommendation is followed here.
Note that, because λ applies to all βc, the eﬀective number of units from
which it is estimated is very large: it is not C, the number of countries, but
CKN, the number of coeﬃcients in β1 ...βC. Therefore, the sample will
contain plenty of information about this parameter, and any truly weakly
informative prior will be dominated. It is easy to show that the conditional
posterior for λ has the inverse gamma form:
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The marginal posterior for λ has a nonstandard form, and it has a nonzero
value at 0, as the data can never completely rule out the homogeneous case
(see Gelman et al., 2003).
The main diﬀerence between this paper’s approach and that of Canova
(2005), who works with a similar model, in that he does not use a prior for his
parameters, which play the same role as λ, nor does he analyze their posterior
distribution. Rather, he conditions on their values found by maximizing
the predictive density in a subsample. He is working with a single panel,
while the focus of this paper is to compare two panels. Here we want to
properly account for the posterior uncertainty about the heterogeneity within
each panel in order to make meaningful comparisons of heterogeneities across
panels. Also, he does not adjust the prior variance to account for diﬀerent
magnitudes of coeﬃcients, like we do in equation (7).
2.3 Identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks
Identiﬁcation of the structural model assumes a small open economy with the
exchange rate ﬂexible enough to react immediately to monetary policy, and
monetary policy that reacts immediately to exchange rate movements. This
assumption remains valid also in the presence of managed exchange rates
with target bands, like the European Union’s ERM, and in the arrangements
in the NMS in our sample, as long as the rate is not eﬀectively ﬁxed. It is
a known empirical regularity (conﬁrmed in the robustness analysis for this
paper) that for countries other than the USA, identiﬁcation schemes that do
not allow the exchange rate to respond immediately to the interest rate, and
vice versa, tend to produce a price puzzle, i.e. an initially positive response
of prices to monetary policy tightening (for more on this subject see e.g. Kim
and Roubini, 2000).
The endogenous variables in the VARs are: a measure of real output, the
consumer price level, the short-term interest rate and the exchange rate in
national currency units per foreign currency unit, all measured at monthly
frequency (more details about the series and their transformations are given
in the next section and in the appendix). A money aggregate is not included
in the baseline speciﬁcation: It is assumed that the central banks target short-
term interest rates and adjust monetary aggregates consistently with this
objective. In this setup, interest rates reﬂect only money supply decisions,
and monetary aggregate ﬂuctuations also carry information about money
demand. Since identifying money demand is beyond the scope of this paper,
we conserve degrees of freedom and do not include money aggregates in the
baseline speciﬁcation. We also follow the common practice of not including
ﬁscal variables, which is justiﬁed in monetary VARs as long as ﬁscal policy17
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is passive (in the sense of Leeper, 1991). This is no more controversial
for the NMS than for the euro area countries. It is reasonable to assume
that in both regions and both sample periods, monetary policy focused on
maintaining low inﬂation in a manner independent of ﬁscal policy.
In order not to confuse domestic monetary policy shocks with the cen-
tral banks’ responses to external developments, speciﬁcations include several
foreign variables which are treated as exogenous. These include world-wide
variables (commodity prices and the US Fed Funds rate) and German vari-
ables (interest rate, output and the exchange rate), reﬂecting Germany’s
importance as an export market and the Bundesbank’s leading role in the
region.
As is standard in the identiﬁed VAR literature, we assume that structural
shocks are orthogonal, which means that the covariance matrix of the VAR
residuals conveys information about the coeﬃcients of the contemporaneous
relationships between endogenous variables. The relationship between the
vector of structural shocks υct and the vector of VAR innovations uct is as
follows:
Gcυct = uct (10)
where var(υct)=IN (identity matrix of order N) and var(uct)=Σc = GcG 
c.
Therefore, the identiﬁcation involves ﬁnding an appropriate factorization Gc
of the residual covariance matrix. The monetary policy shock is the only
shock identiﬁed here. We identify it with the following two assumptions:
1. Output and prices do not respond immediately to the monetary policy
shock.
2. The monetary policy shock is the one which involves a negative co-
movement of the interest rate and the exchange rate on impact.







































← interest rate innovation
← exchange rate innovation
(11)
where + denotes coeﬃcients that are constrained to be positive, 0 denotes
zero restrictions and • denotes unconstrained coeﬃcients.   υct3 is the mon-
etary policy shock. The triangular form of the upper left block of the Gc
matrix reﬂects a normalization, which has no eﬀect on the impulse responses
to the monetary policy shock.18
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Assumption 1 is standard in the VAR literature. Assumption 2 is justiﬁed
by a standard mechanism: an exogenous interest rate increase by the central
bank makes local currency assets more attractive and immediately leads to
capital inﬂows, and appreciation of the currency. An opposite comovement
is also theoretically possible. The key to the alternative mechanism is that
higher interest rates increase the cost of debt servicing. When the risk of
default is suﬃciently high initially or when the interest rate increase is suf-
ﬁciently large, country’s assets may actually become less attractive, and a
capital outﬂow and an exchange rate depreciation would follow. Blanchard
(2004) studies an episode in Brazil in which this second mechanism may have
switched on. We cannot rule out the presence of such episodes in the an-
alyzed sample, but on average such perverse eﬀects of monetary policy are
not a concern of both region’s central banks.
The negative comovement of the interest rate and the exchange rate dis-
tinguishes monetary policy shocks from all other shocks, which involve the
opposite comovement. Other shocks, which may have both internal and ex-
ternal origin, cause capital to ﬂow e.g. into the country, bidding up the
exchange rate and bidding down interest rates, or forcing the central bank
to lower the interest rates to prevent further currency appreciation.6
The precise elasticities of interest rates to exchange rates and vice versa,
conditional on both shocks, are not known, and the sign restriction discrim-
inates between shocks only approximately. This is captured in the appropri-
ately wide uncertainty bands around impulse responses.
Technically, factorizations satisfying (11) are obtained by multiplying the





where V is a 2 × 2 random orthonormal matrix, until a draw is found that
complies with the restrictions. The approach follows Uhlig (2005) and, as
discussed there, from the Bayesian point of view it amounts to multiplying
the prior discussed in the previous section by a uniform prior on the space of
orthonormal matrices times an indicator function, selecting the orthonormal
matrices which deliver the restriction.
6Many central banks implicitly target some Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), i.e. a
weighted average of the interest rate and the exchange rate. Investment banks’ analyses
and IMF country reports routinely analyze monetary policy stance with the help of MCI’s,
even though few central banks admit to targeting them explicitly.19
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3 Empirical Results
3.1 The baseline speciﬁcation
We analyze two panels of countries: ﬁve euro area countries (EA5) and four
of the New Member States (NMS4) of the European Union. The reference
point for the NMS countries are the EA countries in the years 1987-1998, i.e.
in the period before the euro adoption. The goal of the paper is to compare
the two regions within the same econometric framework, and therefore we
include only countries with a ﬂexible (i.e. not ﬁxed) exchange rate, to which
the same identiﬁcation scheme is applicable.
The EA5 panel consists of Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands were excluded because of their quasi-
ﬁxed exchange rate against the D-mark7, Ireland because of the lack of
monthly CPI data, and Greece because of the lack of interbank interest rates
for much of the sample. Finally, Germany is excluded because of its special
status as both regions’ economic locomotive, with the leading role of the
Bundesbank. Instead, German variables are included as exogenous controls
for all countries.
The NMS4 panel consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia. Bulgaria and the Baltic countries were excluded because they have
had currency boards. In Romania and Slovakia, for much of the sample,
market interest rates ﬂuctuate strongly and independently of the central
bank interest rates. This suggests that the standard model of monetary
management, which underlies this analysis, where the central bank manages
market interest rates by setting its instrument interest rate, has not been
ﬁrmly in place. Another possibility is that these countries experienced big
shocks to money demand which were not accommodated by the central bank.
In either case, the identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks adopted here
might not be appropriate.
The sample periods for the NMS4 countries span the period from the
second half of the 1990s up to late 2007 and diﬀer for each country, de-
pending on when the post-transition exchange rate controls were relaxed.
The information on the chronology of the exchange rate regimes and other
developments was taken from various issues of IMF Country Reports. The
sample for the Czech Republic starts in January 1998, with the introduction
of inﬂation targeting (this avoids the Czech currency crisis of 1997). The
sample for Hungary begins in April 1995, and for Poland in May 1995, when
both countries introduced crawling band regimes. The sample for Slovenia
7We follow Mojon and Peersman (2001) who also consider them separately for this
reason.20
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starts in May 1997, when it introduced a new monetary framework, which is
considered to be a regime shift. For the euro area countries, we consider a
sample similar in length to that of the NMS, covering 1987 to 1998 (to the
introduction of the euro).
The data is monthly. The endogenous variables - output, prices, inter-
est rates and exchange rates - are measured respectively by the log of the
index of industrial production, log of the consumer price index, the short-
term market interest rate and the log of the exchange rate in national cur-
rency units per euro. Before 1998 the exchange rate is that of the D-mark
multiplied by the oﬃcial conversion rate of the D-mark to the euro. Two
groups of exogenous variables are included to control for world-wide devel-
opments and developments in Germany. World factors are represented by
the Federal Funds rate, oil prices and non-fuel commodity prices (converted
to euros). German developments are represented by the index of industrial
production in Germany, the interest rate on the German interbank market
and the euro(D-mark)/USD exchange rate. Data have mostly supported the
speciﬁcation in which the coeﬃcients of the world variables are shrunk with
the exchangeable prior and the coeﬃcients of German variables are excluded
from the exchangeable prior. Data sources are provided in the appendix.
The interest rate of 0.1 corresponds to 10% (1000 basis points). The
variables other than the interest rate are logs of indexes that assume the
value 1 in December 1995. The basic speciﬁcation contains six lags of the
endogenous variables and lags zero and one of the exogenous variables. The
exception is German industrial production: it is assumed that foreign central
banks observe it with a lag, so lags one and two are included. Shorter lag
length of the exogenous variables is chosen to conserve the degrees of freedom.
3.2 Impulse responses
We simulate the posterior distribution of the coeﬃcients using the Gibbs
sampler.8 Figure 1 presents the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles of the posterior
distribution of impulse responses to a one standard deviation monetary policy
shock, in the mean model for each panel. This is the model implied by ( ¯ β),
8The results are based on 1,000 draws from the posterior obtained from a sequence of
1,010,000 draws, from which we discard the ﬁrst 10,000, and save every 1000th draw from
the remaining sequence. Draws are very autocorrelated, and therefore saving only every
1000th was deemed to be optimal for storage considerations. We establish convergence
using the Geweke (1992) diagnostics for convergence of a Markov chain implemented in the
coda R package (Plummer et al., 2007). Sequences initialized with the country-by-country
point estimates and those initialized with perturbed fully pooled estimates converge to the
same distributions.21
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and the mean residual variance, which for each draw is computed from the
residuals Uc of all countries. Responses are shown for three years (36 months)
after the shock.
The immediate (period 0) responses of all variables simply reﬂect the
identifying assumptions: 1) in the month of the shock, output and prices
are unaﬀected, and 2) the interest rate rises and the exchange rate falls
(appreciates). The identiﬁed monetary policy shock is associated with a
median interest rate increase of 45 basis points in the NMS4 and almost
60 basis points in the EA5. The median initial appreciation is similar in
both panels, around 1.2%. The interest rate increase is reversed after about
one year, while the appreciation persists for about 1.5 years. The economies
respond with a transitory output decline and a possibly permanent reduction
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Figure 1: Mean impulse responses to monetary policy shocks for the NMS4
and EA5: median, 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution
Overall, the impulse responses are similar. Output responses to a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock are negative and transitory (they last
about two years), and price level responses are negative and very persistent.22
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The uncertainty bands largely overlap. It is reassuring that, in spite of the
diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial structures and often stressed peculiarities of the
transition from the centrally planned economy, basic economic models seem
to be applicable in both regions. Impulse responses of output and prices in
the NMS4 are estimated with less precision. The uncertainty bands for the
NMS4 include, for horizons longer than six months, the possibility of much
stronger price responses than in the EA5. In the short run, the comparison
is reversed, and the point estimates of the NMS4 price responses are weaker,
but this comparison is less statistically signiﬁcant than the comparison for
longer horizons. The median price level response to a standard monetary
policy shock after 18 months is 0.2% in the NMS4, and only less than 0.1%
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Figure 2: Shares of monetary policy shocks in variance decompositions of
output and prices in the NMS4 and EA5: median, 5th and 95th percentiles
of the posterior distribution
Figure 2 presents contributions of monetary policy shocks to forecast
variance of output and prices in both regions, for horizons up to three years.
According to the median estimates, at the horizon of 3 years, monetary pol-
icy shocks account for about 24% of the variance of prices in the NMS4,
compared with 17% in the EA5. For output, monetary policy shocks con-
tribute about 6% of the variance in the NMS4 and 11% in the EA5. These
shares are quite high by the standards of the literature. We interpret this as
an indirect support for the employed identiﬁcation scheme: shocks satisfy-
ing our assumptions are indeed present in the data, and may account for an
important share of its variability.
The observation that output responses tend to be similar, while those of
prices are stronger in the NMS4, suggests that the output cost of disinﬂation
facing the NMS4 central bankers might be lower. We examine this closer by23
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comparing across regions the output cost of constraining price level growth
with an exogenous monetary policy tightening. We calculate this cost as
follows:











h denotes the response of variable x (where x is either y - output, or
p - price level) to a monetary policy shock after h periods. While interpreting
this statistic, it is best to think of impulse responses as deviations from the
unconditional forecast (i.e. a forecast computed under the assumption of no
shocks occurring). The numerator shows the average output loss in the H
months after a standard contractionary monetary policy shock, compared
with the scenario without the shock. The denominator shows the diﬀerence
of the price level observed H months after the shock, and the price level which
would have been observed in the absence of the shock. 9
Figure 3 presents the posterior distribution of such cost of disinﬂation for
the two-year horizon. This ﬁgure shows that in the NMS4, for the price level
to grow by one percent less than in the unconditional forecast in a two year
period, the authorities need to consent to the output path which is about 0.5
of a percent below the unconditional forecast on average during these two
years. In the EA5 such an output cost will amount to around 1.5 percent.
Another ﬁnding in Figure 1 is that a standard monetary policy shock is
associated with a stronger movement of the interest rate in the EA5 countries.
We do not emphasize this ﬁnding, because, as shown below in the individual
country results and in the section on robustness, the size of the average
monetary policy shock may be sensitive to the sample.
Figure 4 presents impulse responses to a monetary policy shock for each of
the analyzed countries. In this subsection we focus on the impulse responses
obtained with the exchangeable prior, whose 5th and 95th percentiles are
represented by the continuous line. (Impulse responses obtained without
the exchangeable prior, represented by gray areas, are discussed in the next
subsection.) Country impulse responses obtained with the exchangeable prior
diﬀer mainly by the scale of the shock, which is country speciﬁc. Their shapes
are similar and close to those of the mean impulse responses, suggesting that
9Sacriﬁce ratios calculated from VARs are studied in Cecchetti and Rich (2001). Their
calculation is based on a VAR with the second diﬀerence of price level, which makes
it possible to deﬁne the sacriﬁce ratio as the output cost of a permanent reduction in
inﬂation. The VAR in this paper does not impose a unit root in the inﬂation process, nor
even in the price level process, so the output cost of aﬀecting prices needs to be deﬁned
diﬀerently.24
ECB









-4 -2  0  2  4  6  8  10
NMS4
EA5
Figure 3: Posterior distribution of the output cost of disinﬂation (24 months
horizon)
the posterior is relatively close to the panel VAR speciﬁcation, but some
caveats to this conclusion will be discussed in the next subsection.
The amplitudes of monetary policy shocks vary widely. In the NMS4
panel, the 95th percentile of the immediate interest rate response is as much
as 100 basis points in Poland, and only 20 basis points in the Czech Republic.
The 5th percentile of the immediate exchange rate response is as much as 2%
in Poland, and less than 1% in Slovenia. The response of prices in the Czech
Republic is most statistically signiﬁcant: the uncertainty bands put very little
weight on positive initial price responses. In other countries price responses
have considerable probability mass on both sides of zero in the ﬁrst months.
In Slovenia, they are also weakest. Impulse responses of Hungary and Poland
are most similar in shape to the mean responses, which is intuitive, since they
have the longest samples and thus, are likely to have the highest weight in
the posterior.
In the EA5, Portugal is an outlier in terms of the high volatility of its
interest rate movements and, in the medium term, its output responses.
However, when we repeat the estimation dropping Portugal, the mean size
of the interest rate is much lower, but all the remaining comparisons with
the NMS4 are unaﬀected. In Portugal and France, exchange rates move little
relative to the interest rate movements. Otherwise, the qualitative features
of the impulse responses are similar.
The ﬁrst lesson from these results is that, when comparing the central-
eastern and the western Europe, we need to go beyond the simple rule of
thumb that monetary policy is less eﬀective in less ﬁnancially developed25
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Finland France Italy Portugal Spain
B. EA5 panel
Figure 4: Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in the NMS4 and the
EA5, 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior. Continuous line: results with
the exchangeable prior; shaded regions: country-by-country estimation.26
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countries. After a few months’ lag, a standard monetary policy shock is
likely to have an even stronger impact on prices in the NMS4 than in the
EA5. The precise comparison the eﬀect of equal monetary policy shocks is
tricky to conduct, because the monetary policy shock involves a simultaneous
movement of two variables: the interest rate and the exchange rate, and their
relative response is diﬀerent. However, it is clear from Figure 1 that whether
we normalize the shocks to involve the same movement of the interest rate,
or of some linear combination of the interest rate and the exchange rate, the
eﬀect on prices is, in the medium term, stronger in the NMS4.
Second, the output cost of disinﬂation is lower in the NMS4 than in the
EA5. This is consistent with the prediction of economic theory, that the
Phillips curve is steeper in countries with higher and more volatile inﬂation.
3.3 Eﬀects of the exchangeable prior
In this subsection we compare the posterior obtained with the exchange-
able prior to the posteriors estimated under two limiting cases: no pooling
(country-by-country estimation) and full pooling (panel VAR estimation).
First, to characterize the tradeoﬀs involved in shrinking the coeﬃcients, we
look at the indicators of model ﬁt and overparameterization proposed in
Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) (see also Gelman et al., 2003, pp.179-184). Then
we comment on the eﬀects of scaling prior variances in equation (7), and
report the posterior distribution of λ. Finally, we discuss how impulse re-
sponses to monetary policy shocks estimated with no pooling and with full
pooling diﬀer from those estimated with the exchangeable prior.
Table 2 reports statistics for model comparison introduced by Spiegel-
halter et al. (2002). The ﬁrst statistic is the expected deviance ˆ Davg,w h i c h
measures the ﬁt of the model to the data on average over the posterior dis-
tribution.10 The expected deviance is related to the mean squared error,
and therefore the smaller it is, the better is the ﬁt, and it is not comparable
across samples. For both the NMS4 and the EA5 panels, the ﬁt, as mea-
sured by this statistic, is best for the country-by-country estimation (-14,114
and -20,384 respectively) and worst for the panel VAR (-13,792 and -19,827
respectively). The exchangeable prior is in between: it has a better ﬁt than
the panel VAR, but a worse ﬁt than the models estimated individually for
countries.
10D e v i a n c ei sd e ﬁ n e da sD(y,θ)=−2logp(y|θ), where y denotes data and θ denotes
p a r a m e t e r s . F o rt h en o r m a lm o d e lt h ed e v i a n c ei sp r o p o r t i o n a lt ot h em e a ns q u a r e d
error. The expected deviance is computed as the deviance averaged over the posterior
distribution of the parameters.27
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country-by-country -14114 632 633.1 -13481
pooled -13792 272 263.4 -13529
exchangeable prior -13819 632 278.4 -13540
exchangeable prior (no scaling) -13797 632 266.3 -13531
EA5
country-by-country -20384 790 786.2 -19597
pooled -19827 310 300.8 -19526
exchangeable prior -19959 790 327.5 -19631
exchangeable prior (no scaling) -19960 790 339.1 -19621
†The parameters for each country were counted as follows: coeﬃcients of lagged depen-
dent variables = 4 equations × 4v a r i a b l e s× 6 lags; coeﬃcients of exogenous controls to
which the exchangeable prior applies = 4 equations × 3v a r i a b l e s× 2 lags; coeﬃcients
of exogenous controls to which the exchangeable prior does not apply = 4 equations × 3
variables × 2 lags + 4 constant terms; unique terms in the 4×4 variance matrix = 10.
The second statistic is the eﬀective number of parameters pD.F o rc o m -
parison, we also provide the simple count of parameters explicitly entering
the likelihood function. The simple count of parameters in a Bayesian model
can easily exceed the number of observations, but this does not mean that
such a model has negative degrees of freedom, because the prior information
also carries information about parameters. pD is a way to measure the num-
ber of free parameters eﬀectively estimated from the data. When the prior is
noninformative, pD approximately corresponds to the parameter count (the
exact equality holds in simple special cases, e.g. in a linear normal model
with known variances), but when the prior is informative, it will be lower
(and need not be an integer). In a hierarchical model this measure depends
on the ’focus’ on the level of parameter hierarchy, and here we focus on the
parameters of the individual countries’ VARs (not on the regional means).
See Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion and derivation of this
measure.
As shown in Table 2, the estimates of the eﬀective number of parameters
for the models with the ﬂat prior (the country-by-country speciﬁcation and
the fully pooled speciﬁcation) are indeed quite close to the actual count of
the parameters. The estimate pD is particularly close to the parameter count28
ECB
Working Paper Series No 970
November 2008
in the country-by-country estimation for the NMS4 (633.1 vs 632). In the
remaining cases the estimated eﬀective number of parameters is somewhat
smaller then the parameter count (263.4 vs 272, 786.2 vs 790, and 300.8 vs
310). In both regions, the eﬀective number of parameters in the model with
the exchangeable prior (278.4 for the NMS4 and 327.5 for the EA5) is much
smaller than the parameter count (632 and 790), and close to that in the
panel VAR (272 and 310). This conﬁrms the conclusion from comparing
the individual country impulse responses in Figure 4, that the a-posteriori
optimal strength of shrinkage is quite strong, and quite close to assuming
homogeneity within panels.
The third statistic, the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) of Spiegel-
halter et al. (2002), summarizes the tradeoﬀ between the ﬁt and overparam-
eterization. The DIC is simply the sum of the expected deviance and the
eﬀective number of parameters, and obviously the smaller it is, the better the
model. It is designed to pick the model with the best out-of-sample predictive
power in the included countries. We have seen that the exchangeable prior
allows us to achieve a reasonable ﬁt while estimating eﬀectively less than half
of the parameters needed in the unconstrained estimation. As shown in the
last column of Table 2, in both regions this gives it an advantage in terms of
the DIC.
An alternative to the model-comparison criteria discussed here would
be to introduce informative priors and compute Bayesian odds ratios for
alternative models. In the presence of good prior information this would
certainly be advantageous, but in the present context, one would have to
resort to using ’weakly informative’ priors in many dimensions. This tends to
make odds ratios sensitive to the particular choice of the ’weakly informative’
priors and, because of this, is discouraged by some authors (see e.g. Gelman
et al., 2003, example on pp.185-186).
A separate line in the table reports, for each region, results for the ex-
changeable prior used without taking into account the scaling terms from
equation (7), which reﬂect the magnitudes of coeﬃcients. That is, equation
(7) is replaced with the relation: var(βc(k,n)) = λ. This could, potentially,





equal to 1 for the coeﬃcients of own lags of a variable, but, in our data,
ˆ σ2 of e.g. oil price exceeds those of interest rates by orders of magnitude.
In both the NMS4 panel and the EA5 panel, this alternative speciﬁcation
produces a lower DIC than in the baseline speciﬁcation, but the diﬀerence is
small. In the NMS4 it leads to a somewhat stronger posterior shrinkage, and
in the EA5 to a weaker posterior shrinkage than in the model with scaling.
This lack of consistent pattern is intuitive, because scaling does not matter29
ECB















































 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35
exchange rate
Figure 5: Mean impulse responses to monetary policy shocks for the NMS4
and EA5: median, 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution. No
scaling of λ.
in the two extreme cases: no pooling and full pooling. Consequently, if the
scaling in the prior diﬀers from the scaling in the data generating process,
the posterior degree of shrinking can end up being either stronger or weaker
than in the data generating process.
Figure 5 shows impulse responses to a monetary policy shock estimated
with this speciﬁcation of the prior variance. Impulse responses in the NMS4
are hardly aﬀected, but both price and output impulse responses in the EA5
are stronger. Therefore, with this speciﬁcation we would not conclude that
the response of prices in the NMS4 is stronger than in the EA5. However,
the comparison of the output costs of disinﬂation shown in Figure 6 is not
aﬀected. Therefore, under this speciﬁcation the output cost of disinﬂation
is still lower in the high-inﬂation NMS4 panel than in the low-inﬂation EA5
panel, as predicted by economic theory.
We return to the baseline speciﬁcation, using the scaling in equation (7).
We have shown how diﬀerent degrees of information pooling across countries
aﬀect ﬁt and overparameterization. Now we turn to studying their eﬀect on
the substantive conclusions that can be drawn about monetary transmission.30
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Figure 6: Posterior distribution of the output cost of disinﬂation (24-month
horizon). No scaling of λ.
Figure 7 illustrates the dangers of applying excessive shrinking. It compares
the euro area panel’s mean impulse responses obtained with the exchangeable
prior against those obtained with full pooling, i.e. with the panel VAR
model. The panel VAR results exhibit much more persistence, which is often
an artifact of imposing homogeneity on a heterogeneous panel, as shown in
Pesaran and Smith (1995). Most strikingly, the eﬀect of monetary policy
shocks on output is permanent in the panel estimation (whereas it dies away
in the exchangeable prior estimation), with dramatic implications for the
implied output cost of disinﬂation.11 Mean impulse responses for the NMS4
panel turn out to be very similar with full pooling and with the exchangeable
prior, so they are not reported for brevity’s sake.12
Figure 4 allows to compare individual countries’ impulse responses to
monetary policy shocks obtained with the exchangeable prior against those
obtained with country-by-country estimation (which are represented with
shaded areas). VARs estimated on individual country data are heavily over-
parameterized, given the length of the available samples. For individual
countries we have only 3.1 to 4.1 observations per estimated parameter in
11Interestingly, the VAR results for individual countries in Mojon and Peersman (2001)
and for the euro area in Peersman and Smets (2001) show a similar phenomenon: output
responses to monetary policy shock die out in all countries except France, but in the
estimation on the euro area data they are permanent (Mojon and Peersman, 2001, Graph
1a-b).
12However, in the shorter samples studied in the next subsection, also the NMS4 full
pooling and exchangeable prior results diﬀer importantly.31
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Figure 7: Impulse responses in the EA5 panel: exchangeable prior and full
pooling
the NMS4, and 3.9 in the EA5. Results based on such short data have to
be treated with caution. As often found in this situation, several impulse
responses exhibit cycling behavior which is probably spurious (especially:
price response in the Czech Republic, output response in Slovenia, interest
rate response in Portugal, and exchange rate response in Finland). Many
impulse responses, especially those of output, are insigniﬁcant. Finally, at
longer horizons the responses sometimes diverge (e.g. output responses in the
Czech Republic and Finland), which implies a nonstationary model or col-
lapse to zero (responses of Slovenia and France) which implies a high degree
of certainty that the model is stationary with little persistence. Impulse re-
sponses obtained with the exchangeable prior exhibit fewer of these extreme
phenomena and greatly facilitate comparisons across panels.
The strength of shrinkage is governed by the overall tightness parameter
λ. Figure 8 presents the posterior densities of the square root of this param-
eter in each of the panels. Taking the tightness of the well known Minnesota
prior as the benchmark, the posterior mass is concentrated on rather low val-32
ECB








 0  0.005  0.01  0.015  0.02  0.025
NMS4
EA5
Figure 8: Simulated posterior distribution of
√
λ in the NMS4 panel and in
the EA5 panel
ues.13 This might give an impression that the posterior is close to the panel
VAR model, and indeed this is what we see comparing impulse responses of
individual countries. However, the size of
√
λ is tricky to interpret. In large
time series models with roots near unity, small diﬀerences in many individual
coeﬃcients can results in large diﬀerences in impulse responses. As shown in
Figure 7, in the EA5 panel excessive shrinking distorts the impulse responses
signiﬁcantly. Therefore, the low posterior probability of
√
λ smaller than
0.0025 in the EA5 panel (seen in Figure 8) is important for the results.
An alternative to using the ﬂat prior for λ endorsed by Gelman (2006),
is to use ’weakly informative’ priors, but some care is needed in this case.
Natural ’weakly informative’ priors for λ are of inverse-gamma form with
small scale and degrees of freedom. We have found that priors IG2( , ) with
  ≤ 0.001 are indeed neutral, and produce similar results as the ﬂat prior.
However, although inverse gamma densities with low degrees of freedom have
a relatively fat right tail, their left tail is thin and, as a result, they are actu-
ally very informative in ruling out values in the vicinity of zero.14 Therefore,
13√
λ corresponds to the ’overall tightness parameter’ of the Minnesota prior. The RATS
manual (Doan, 2000) suggests, as a benchmark, values of this parameter of 0.2 to 0.1. In
contrast, most of the posterior mass of
√
λ lays below the value of 0.01, so the posterior
is more than ten times tighter. However, the Minnesota prior is centered at the random
walk model which is a very crude description of the data. In contrast, the posterior λ
shows the tightness around the posterior mean model ¯ β which is ﬁtted to the analyzed
data and which is random itself.
14This is a diﬀerent problem with ’weakly informative’ inverse gamma densities than33
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Figure 9: Mean impulse responses to monetary policy shocks for the NMS4
and EA5: median, 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution.
Prior p(λ)=I G 2(0.1,0.1).
e.g. the prior IG2(0.1,0.1) produces posteriors of
√
λ which support much
less shrinkage than in the benchmark case. They are peaked at 0.05 and they
have almost no mass below 0.04. The resulting mean impulse responses are
presented in Figure 9. Their uncertainty bands are wider and no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between NMS4 and EA5 can be seen.
The previous discussion gives an idea of the sensitivity of the results to
informative priors for λ. Informative priors that support strong shrinkage do
not aﬀect the NMS4 results much, but bias the EA5 results towards those
in Figure 7. This sharpens the diﬀerence in the output cost of disinﬂation
across regions, observed in the benchmark speciﬁcation, and reinforces our
conclusions. On the other hand, informative priors that support weak shrink-
age result in less signiﬁcant results, in which any diﬀerences between NMS4
and EA5 are blurred.
that stressed in Gelman (2006). Gelman considers a case where the shrinking parameter
is likely to be quite large and is estimated with very few units. In his case, even the right
tail of the prior is thin enough to have a strong eﬀect on the results. In our example, the
problem is the left tail.34
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3.4 Robustness checks
In this subsection we report a number of robustness checks. First, we check
how the NMS results change across the high- and low-inﬂation subsamples.
Then we study the importance of the most volatile sample periods for the
estimated results. Subsequently, we report the results of other modiﬁcations
of the baseline speciﬁcation.
We have found that the output cost of disinﬂation was lower in the NMS4
and we have interpreted this ﬁnding as a result of their higher inﬂation rates
and/or more volatile conditions. If this interpretation is correct, one should
expect higher output costs of disinﬂation in the more recent subsamples,
when inﬂation in NMS4 has been more in line with inﬂation observed in EA5
(see Table 1). To check this, we repeat the estimation in the subsamples
starting in January 1999 and January 2000.
Figure 10 reports responses of output and prices in the NMS4 in the full
sample, and in the two shorter subsamples. Full sample results for the EA5
panel are added in each plot for comparison. Interest rate and exchange rate
responses, which are not shown, are slightly weaker in the later samples. The
initial interest rate response is 38 basis points in the sample starting in 1999
and 34 basis points in the sample starting in 2000. All plots (including those
for the EA5) show responses rescaled to a 50 basis points shock. This may
improve their comparability, although it should be kept in mind that the
NMS shock is associated with a stronger exchange rate movement, relative
to the interest rate, than the EA5 shock. Therefore, eﬀectively, it involves
tighter monetary conditions.
As seen in Figure 10, in the later samples the NMS output responses
become somewhat stronger and price responses become weaker. Samples are
short and the uncertainty is high, so that individually these changes are not
very statistically signiﬁcant. However, the distributions of the output cost
of disinﬂation presented in Figure 11 conﬁrm that output cost of disinﬂation
in the NMS4 becomes higher, and similar to that in the EA5. Therefore,
this evidence is consistent with output cost of disinﬂation increasing when
inﬂation falls, and with the NMS4 and EA5 becoming more similar over time.
An important link in the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and
a potential source of relevant heterogeneity between EMU and NMS, is the
response of long term rates to monetary policy. However, markets for long
term bonds were developed only in the new millennium in most of the NMS
and 5-dimensional VARs on the resulting shorter samples are estimated with
too much uncertainty to allow any meaningful comparisons.
The next question we address is whether the baseline results are not
driven by periods of exceptional volatility in ﬁnancial markets. In general35
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volatile periods are a boon for the econometrician, because they carry pre-
cious information: larger movements of the examined variables allow better
identiﬁcation of the coeﬃcients. However, it would be troubling if the re-
sults depended exclusively on few special events. The sample used for the
EA5 countries, spanning 1987 to 1998, contains the volatile period of the
ERM crisis in 1992, as well as the Mexican peso crisis of 1995, which had
an impact on some of the western European countries. Eastern European
countries were, for their part, strongly aﬀected by the Russian crisis in 1998.
Figure 12 presents the posterior medians of the estimated monetary policy
shocks. It conﬁrms that most of the largest monetary policy shocks occurred
exactly during these volatile periods.
Such time-varying volatility of the shocks would call for more sophis-
ticated methods, such as the VARs with time-varying volatilities of Uhlig
(1997) or Markov-switching VARs of Sims and Zha (2006). Their applica-
tion in conjunction with the exchangeable prior used here is a subject of
further research. For the present purposes, we choose a simpler approach
and remove the volatile periods from the sample, by truncating the samples
and introducing period-speciﬁc dummy observations. In dynamic models,
such dummying-out does not remove the information from these periods per-
fectly, because the delayed eﬀect of the shocks in these periods persist for
some time, but it certainly limits their eﬀects on the results. In order to
ensure that the eﬀect of the volatile periods is strongly suppressed, we used
sequences of consecutive dummy observations. Dummying-out is simpler,
but of course it involves a greater information loss than eﬃcient use of both
volatile and calm periods.
The continuous vertical lines in Figure 12 show periods for which dummy
observations were introduced, and the dashed vertical lines in the beginning
of the sample show the points up to which the samples were truncated. We
will refer to the estimates in those truncated samples with dummy variables
included as calm sample estimates.
The Russian crisis erupted in August 1998, but was preceded by the
Asian crisis, which also aﬀected the Czech economy. Therefore, in the Czech
Republic the sample was truncated from the beginning until July 1999. In
Hungary and Poland, the half-year period starting in August 1998 was dum-
mied out. Furthermore, in Hungary we remove the large 1996 monetary
policy shock, that occurred when the central bank devalued the exchange
rate to help implement the Bokros package of ﬁscal reforms. We remove the
ﬁrst half of 2003 (in January 2003 the forint came under speculative attack;
see e.g. IMF Country Report No. 03/124) and the volatile period in 2006
when ﬁscal uncertainties resulted in pressures on ﬁnancial markets (see e.g.
IMF Country Report No.07/250). In Poland we additionally remove a four-36
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month period in the middle of 2001 when political attacks on the central
bank caused uncertainty in ﬁnancial markets.
For Finland we dummy out the 26-month period starting from March
1991, during which the economy was in crisis and suﬀered a number of ex-
ternal shocks, from the collapse of the trade with the Soviet Union to spec-
ulative attacks (Honkapohja and Koskela, 1999). For France, Italy, Portugal
and Spain, we dummy out the neighborhoods of the ERM crisis in the second
half of 1992 and early 1993, as well as the Mexican peso crisis in the ﬁrst
half of 1995. In addition, we dummy out a volatile period in Portugal in late
1990/early 1991, and truncate the Spanish sample in the beginning to avoid
the volatile ﬁrst half of 1987.
Table 3 reports how successful we are in eliminating volatile periods. It
reports normality tests for the median monetary policy shocks, both the
baseline estimates and the calm sample estimates (the periods with dummy
variables have zero shocks not included in the computation of the test statis-
tics). Thanks to the inclusion of constant terms to which the exchangeable
priors do not apply, shocks always have a mean close to zero. Lack of skew-
ness cannot be rejected for all countries except for Hungary and France. Most
importantly for the present discussion, lack of excess kurtosis is rejected at
the 5% signiﬁcance level in all countries except Slovenia. However, as indi-
cated by the statistics in the last two columns, the shocks estimated on the
calm samples exhibit no skewness and excess kurtosis disappears in all cases
except Portugal.
Figure 13 shows the mean impulse responses estimated in the calm sam-
ples (with all the period dummies). Two observations stand out. First, the
amplitude of the interest rate and the exchange rate movements conditional
on the standard monetary policy shock is aﬀected by the periods included.
Without volatile periods, standard monetary policy shocks are associated in
both NMS4 and EA5 with a median interest rate increase of about 40 basis
points, instead of, respectively, 45 and 60 basis points in the baseline estima-
tion. The median exchange rate appreciation is 1% and 0.6% respectively,
compared with 1.2% in both countries in the baseline estimation. Second,
impulse responses of output and prices are barely aﬀected, and all obser-
vations stressed in the previous subsection (larger uncertainty around the
NMS4 responses, stronger median NMS4 price response, and lower output
cost of disinﬂation in NMS4 - see Figure 14) go through.
In another robustness check we tried reﬁning the identiﬁcation of mone-
tary policy shocks by using the dynamics of the central bank foreign reserves.
Sign restrictions discriminate between the monetary policy and other shocks
only approximately, because we do not know the precise elasticity of the reac-
tion of the exchange rate to exogenous interest rate movements. As a result,37
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Table 3: Normality tests for the estimated median monetary policy shocks
full sample calm sample
chi2(1) p-value chi2(1) p-value
NMS
Czech Republic
mean 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.99
skewness 0.10 0.75 3.67 0.06
kurtosis 4.16 0.04 2.20 0.14
Hungary
mean 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.99
skewness 26.19 0.00 0.99 0.32
kurtosis 98.67 0.00 1.66 0.20
Poland
mean 0.00 0.98 0.00 1.00
skewness 0.00 0.99 2.15 0.14
kurtosis 4.21 0.04 0.20 0.65
Slovenia
mean 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.99
skewness 0.72 0.40 1.06 0.30
kurtosis 1.14 0.29 1.21 0.27
EA
Finland
mean 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.98
skewness 0.09 0.77 0.03 0.85
kurtosis 20.28 0.00 1.06 0.30
France
mean 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.98
skewness 40.70 0.00 0.94 0.33
kurtosis 319.29 0.00 2.98 0.08
Italy
mean 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.98
skewness 0.34 0.56 0.20 0.66
kurtosis 78.72 0.00 0.00 0.99
Portugal
mean 0.00 0.96 0.00 1.00
skewness 0.03 0.85 0.02 0.90
kurtosis 146.80 0.00 14.22 0.00
Spain
mean 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99
skewness 0.08 0.78 0.35 0.55
kurtosis 40.42 0.00 0.07 0.80
Note: The test statistics for the null hypotheses of no skewness and no excess kurtosis
are computed as in the Jarque-Bera normality test. Denoting the ﬁrst centered sample
moment of the standardized residuals by (μ1), third by (μ3) and fourth by (μ4), the test
statistics are computed, respectively, as Tμ2
3/6a n dT(μ4 − 3)2/24). The test statistic for
t h en u l lh y p o t h e s i so fz e r om e a ni ss i m p l yTμ2
1.38
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the identiﬁed shocks are in fact some linear combination of monetary policy
shocks and other shocks, which involve a capital ﬂow in the opposite direc-
tion. To sift oﬀ better these other shocks we add the following identifying
assumption. We assume that the response of foreign reserves to an exogenous
monetary tightening should be positive, consistently with the higher demand
for the local currency it is supposed to generate.
We use this additional assumption in a speciﬁcation of the VAR with for-
eign reserves as the ﬁfth variable.15 VARs with ﬁve variables are more heavily
overparameterized, and, as shown in Figure 15, the responses of output and
prices in both panels become weaker and less signiﬁcant. The comparison
between output costs of disinﬂation, shown in Figure 16, becomes less stark,
but still suggests a steeper Phillips curve in the NMS4. We conclude that
the qualitative results stressed in this paper are robust to reﬁning the iden-
tiﬁcation of monetary shocks by using the dynamics of foreign reserves.
A drop in foreign reserves conditionally on a monetary policy shock needs
not be a signal of an identiﬁcation failure. Sometimes central banks actively
use foreign exchange market intervention as a monetary policy tool, and the
level of exchange rate as one of the operating targets. Then an exogenous
policy tightening could be implemented as an increase of the interest rate ac-
companied by a sale of foreign currency reserves in order to ensure a stronger
exchange rate appreciation than otherwise. To see what happens on average
in the analyzed samples, we introduce total foreign reserves as the ﬁfth vari-
able, without any constraint on their response to a monetary policy shock.
Impulse responses of output and prices (unreported here) remain similar as in
the baseline speciﬁcation, but, as in Figure 15, they are also less signiﬁcant,
due to the more acute overparameterization of the model. The response of
foreign reserves, displayed in Figure 17, is insigniﬁcant initially, but subse-
quently becomes positive. We conclude that the dynamics of foreign reserves
is consistent with our interpretation of the baseline monetary policy shocks
identiﬁed in this paper.
The analysis was repeated also with the recursive identiﬁcation, assum-
ing that monetary authorities react with a lag to the exchange rate develop-
ments. As shown in Figure 18, under this identiﬁcation, the exchange rate
appreciates with some delay, exhibiting ’delayed overshooting’ leading to the
’forward discount bias puzzle’ discussed in Kim and Roubini (2000). Out-
put responses are initially insigniﬁcant in both panels, and a ’price puzzle’
emerges in the NMS4, i.e. the price response is signiﬁcantly positive initially.
This conﬁrms the ﬁndings of price puzzles under recursive identiﬁcation for
15Logged, data from the International Financial Statistics labeled as Total reserves
minus gold.39
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these countries, reported in a number of VAR studies discussed in Coricelli
et al. (2006). After about two years, both output and price responses are
negative, and the output cost of disinﬂation is again somewhat lower in the
NMS4, although the diﬀerence is small and not statistically signiﬁcant. The
two main conclusions from this exercise are as follows. First, the results from
the recursive identiﬁcation point in the same direction as the baseline results
of this paper. Second, we conﬁrm the ﬁnding of Kim and Roubini (2000)
that allowing for simultaneous reaction of interest rates and exchange rates
to monetary policy shocks is needed for the proper identiﬁcation of these
shocks.
Finally, when the model is estimated with the baseline identiﬁcation
scheme but without any control variables (only constant terms and lags of
endogenous variables), the output response becomes signiﬁcantly stronger in
the EA5 than in the NMS4, and, most importantly, the price response be-
comes positive in the euro area. We conclude that the exogenous controls
are crucial for successfully identifying monetary policy shocks.
4 Conclusions
This paper makes one of the ﬁrst systematic comparisons of the responses to
monetary shocks in western Europe and in the New Member States of the
EU. The responses of the NMS4 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia) turn out to be qualitatively similar to those in the EA5 (Finland,
France, Italy, Portugal and Spain), but with interesting diﬀerences (albeit es-
timated with signiﬁcant uncertainty): while the output responses are broadly
similar, the uncertainty bands for price responses include the possibility of
stronger eﬀects than in the EA5.
These results suggest that, when considering the diﬀerences between
central-eastern and western Europe, we need to go beyond the rule of thumb
that monetary policy is less eﬀective in less ﬁnancially developed countries.
Another feature of these economies, which has been missing from the dis-
cussion so far, and which may be important for monetary transmission, is
the higher inﬂation level and variance that they have experienced in the
1990s. Economic theory (Ball et al., 1988; Dotsey et al., 1999; Lucas, 1973)
predicts that higher (or more volatile) inﬂation makes prices less sticky and
the Phillips curve steeper. Our ﬁndings imply a steeper Phillips curve in
the NMS4 on the full sample (compared with the EA5), consistently with
these predictions. Conﬁrming this interpretation, in the samples excluding
the high-inﬂation 1990s we ﬁnd that the estimated price responses tend to
be weaker and output responses stronger than on the full sample, indicating40
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a ﬂatter Phillips curve.
Among the studied Central and Eastern European countries, Slovenia
adopted the euro in 2007 and the remaining countries have committed to
joining the EMU in the future. The question of similarity of monetary trans-
mission between central-eastern and western European countries is therefore
very relevant. However, some caution is needed in drawing the implications
of this paper’s ﬁndings for the adoption of the euro by the NMS. EMU entry
will result in ﬁxing the currently ﬂoating exchange rates with the main trad-
ing partners, and as a result the exchange rate channel will largely disappear.
Also in other respects EMU entry may potentially be an important regime
change, and therefore the Lucas critique may apply to the extrapolation of
the results from this paper. Consequently, impulse responses reported in
this paper should not be treated as forecasts of the responses to common
monetary policy shocks after the euro adoption.
Instead, this paper compares monetary transmission in the NMS with
that of the current EMU members before they adopted the euro, i.e. it
provides a comparative assessment of the initial conditions. The caveat is,
that for such initial conditions to be informative there should be no major
diﬀerences in the transition to the EMU regime. The results of this paper
do not ﬁnd support for the structural weakness of monetary transmission
in the NMS as an argument against further EMU expansion. However, the
comparisons of this paper may be aﬀected by diﬀerent inﬂation levels and
volatilities in the sample period.41
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Appendix A Data sources and estimation pe-
riods




Consumer price index xxx64...ZF...
Money market interest rate xxx60B..ZF...‡
Exchange rate: local currency per SDR xxx..AA.ZF...
Exchange rate: German currency per SDR 134..AA.ZF...
Exogenous controls
Exchange rate: German currency per USD 134..AE.ZF...
German industrial production 13466..CZF...
German interest rate 13460B..ZF...
Federal funds rate 11160B..ZF...
Petroleum:average crude price POILAPSP
Non-fuel commodities index PNFUELW
Robustness checks
Total reserves minus gold xxx.1L.DZF...
Notes: †Except Poland: 96466..BZF... ‡Except Hungary, where the money market
interest rate was not available and the treasury bill rate, with code 94460C..ZF..., was
used instead.
All data come from the IMF Internatonal Financial Statistics, (available
at http://www.imf.org) except for commodity prices, which are taken from
the IMF Primary Commodity Prices database available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/externaldata.csv
The data were downloaded on February 12th, 2008.
Country exchange rates w.r.t. the German currency (D-mark prior to
1999, euro afterwards) were obtained as the ratio of the rate local currency
per SDR to the rate German currency per SDR.42
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Figure 10: Mean impulse responses to a 50 basis points monetary policy
shock for the NMS4 and the EA5: median, 5th and 95th percentiles of the

















Figure 11: Posterior distribution of the output cost of disinﬂation (24-month
horizon). Samples for NMS4 starting in 1999 and 2000.47
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Figure 12: Median estimated monetary policy shocks and dummies for
volatile periods.48
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Figure 13: Mean impulse responses to monetary policy shocks for the NMS4
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Figure 14: Posterior distribution of the output cost of disinﬂation (24-month
horizon). Calm samples.49
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Figure 15: Mean impulse responses to monetary policy shocks for the NMS4
and EA5: median, 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution.
Speciﬁcation with foreign reserves.50
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Figure 16: Posterior distribution of the output cost of disinﬂation (24-month
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Figure 17: Mean impulse of foreign reserves to a monetary policy shock,
when it is unconstrained in the identiﬁcation.51
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Figure 18: Mean impulse responses to monetary policy shocks for the NMS4
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Figure 19: The posterior distribution of the output cost of disinﬂation (24-
month horizon). Recursive identiﬁcation.52
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